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Abstract 
Reisig, Dawson, Bachelor of Arts, Spring 2016                                                   Economics 
An Empirical Analysis of Pull Factor Influences on EU Asylum Applications 
Faculty Mentor: Ranjan Shrestha 
As Europe continues to face the largest flood of immigration since World War II, the 
foundational solidarity of the European Union (EU) is being severely strained under the burden 
of allocating such a massive population influx and the subsequent issues resulting from complex 
and divisive notions of national responsibility, cooperation, and integration.  In struggling to find 
a cooperative solution to this refugee crisis, a greater understanding of the destination country 
characteristics that shape the asylum application preference would be highly beneficial for policy 
makers and EU citizens.  In examining the relative influences of these pull factors I implement a 
fixed effects regression model in which I analyze the response of monthly asylum applications 
over the period of 2008-2014 to differences in destination country characteristics such as income 
opportunities, welfare benefits, the unemployment rate, the strength of various production 
sectors, and the existing immigrant stock.  In line with previous literature examining migration 
preference, I find that network effects exert a strong upward pressure while the unemployment 
rate exerts a downward pressure.  However, my results show that a country’s welfare benefits 
exert a statistically significant and stronger upward pressure than previously found.  These 
findings shed light on the lack of convergence in asylum applications as they indicate asylum 
seekers are influenced by the economic conditions of destination countries, although historical 
migration networks tend to play a larger role in the destination decision.  As the pull factors I 
found to be significant are difficult for policy makers to influence, my results suggest policy 
makers should instead focus on EU-wide programs such as Tradable Immigration Quotas 
(TIQ)’s, rather than decreasing a country’s relative attractiveness.         
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A New Home: An Empirical Analysis of Pull Factor Influences on EU Asylum Applications 
Introduction 
In the years following 2011, widespread social unrest in Syria developed into sectarian 
conflict and eventually a fully-fledged civil war, displacing entire populations as violence and 
brutal persecution grew to encompass the area.  Adding to the masses of refugees already fleeing 
oppression in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa puts estimates at over one 
million migrants entering the EU in 2015 alone (IOM, 2015); this practically unprecedented 
volume of forced migration has put a severe strain on the institutional solidarity, infrastructure, 
and security of the European Union.  In stark contrast to attempts at alleviating the crisis through 
refugee relocation programs and targeted aid stands a rising trend towards right-wing, anti-
immigrant sentiment.   Following the November 13th Paris attacks, countries are increasingly 
calling for the reinstatement of national border controls due to concerns that the EU’s policy of a 
border-free interior region is facilitating the travel of radicalized individuals (WSJ, 2015).  While 
there has long been a large distributional gap in asylum application rates, under this extreme 
impetus various member states are enacting increasingly restrictive migration polices and 
concentrating the blame of attracting high rates of refugees on the shoulders of countries such as 
Germany for having overly-welcoming policies and too generous of a welfare state.  Finding a 
unified solution to this crisis is paramount to the survival of the EU’s foundational policy of 
border-free travel, not to mention the humanitarian implications of improper action.  
 Boldly declaring his position on the importance of EU solidarity, Hungarian Prime 
Minister Viktor Orban proclaims, “The problem is not a European problem.  The problem is a 
German problem.  Nobody would like to stay in Hungary” (BBC, 2015).  Regardless of whether 
Mr. Orban’s assertion stems more from an analysis of asylum trends or an attempt to relieve his 
country of humanitarian responsibility, the existing body of migratory research suggests asylum 
seekers do prefer some countries over others.  Once an asylum seeker has made the decision to 
flee their home country, what shapes this preference?  Specifically, what socioeconomic 
characteristic is the most influential pull factor on an asylum seeker’s determination of the most 
desirable EU destination country?  Based on the findings of previous studies, the significant 
determinants of migration inflows I will primarily focus on include: income opportunities, the 
unemployment rate, welfare benefits, network effects, the recognition rate, and lastly, the 
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strength of various production sectors (Neumayer, 2004; Hatton, 2009; Thielemann, 2004; 
Mayda, 2005; Jimenez-Jimenez, 2014).   
 
Asylum Policy History 
In order to gain a good grasp on asylum application trends in the EU and the issues 
stemming from them, it is necessary to have a brief understanding of its history of migration and 
asylum policies.  Fully established in 1995, the Schengen Area refers to the interior region of the 
EU that is free of internal border controls and consists of common visa policies across all 
member states, although it does maintain external border controls for those attempting to enter 
into the Schengen Area.  In creating a free-travel area for the purpose of international trade, its 
goal was to facilitate the creation of a single European market (European Commission, 2010).  
The second major policy advancement came in the form of rules implemented under the Dublin 
Regulation, of which the most recent version was signed in 2013.  The Dublin Rules deal directly 
with asylum seekers, and establish policies regarding the determination of which EU member 
state is responsible for processing an asylum application.  Unless petitioned on the grounds of 
having immediate family members in another EU country, the “country of first entry” rule states 
that the first EU member country an asylum seeker sets foot in is responsible for processing their 
claim of asylum.  If a member state believes another EU country should have been liable for 
processing a particular asylum claim, they can file an official Dublin Request in an attempt to 
place the responsibility on the relevant EU member (UNHCR).   As highlighted by issues 
stemming from the current refugee crisis, the rules established under the Dublin Regulation have 
been heavily criticized for placing an unfair burden on those exterior EU states.     
An important introductory distinction to make is the difference in relative definitions 
between an asylum seeker, a refugee, and a migrant.  As defined by Amnesty International, a 
refugee is “a person who has fled their country of origin and is unable or unwilling to return 
because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of their race, religion, nationality, or 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (Amnesty International, 2015).  An 
asylum seeker, then, is someone who is seeking international protection under claims of 
persecution, but has yet to have their asylum application approved by the country to which it was 
submitted, and so has not yet been officially recognized as a refugee.  Finally, an immigrant is 
simply a person who has relocated permanently to a foreign country; thus all asylum seekers 
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technically fall under the definition of immigrants, although an immigrant does not have to be an 
asylum seeker as the term includes those economic migrants who have relocated purely to 
improve their economic well-being.  While I plan on incorporating the methodologies of some 
migration flow studies into my framework (Mayda, 2005; Jimenez-Jimenez, 2013; De Giorgi and 
Pellizzari, 2009), it is prudent to remember this distinction as asylum seekers tend to be under 
much higher pressure to leave their origin country and thus would likely be less swayed by the 
economic conditions of destination countries than those solely seeking a more prosperous 
livelihood.   
While the ongoing refugee crisis has dramatically highlighted the stark disparity of 
asylum seeker burden-sharing within the EU, unequal rates of asylum application and refugee 
recognition have been a persistent phenomenon.  Examining relative asylum application shares 
from the period of 1982-1999, Neumayer (2004) found differences as large as France and 
Germany respectively receiving 20.8% and 15.7% of total EU asylum applications.  This is 
contrasted with countries such as Denmark and Spain, both receiving only 4.3% of total 
applications, after normalizing by destination country population.  Likewise, when comparing 
the two time periods of 1997-2001 with 2001-2006, Hatton  (2009) found that yearly 
applications rose by roughly 50% in France, Austria, and Sweden, while falling by more than 
50% in Germany, Hungary, and the Netherlands.  Although some of the temporal single-country 
application rate changes found can be explained by variation in source country push factors, the 
opposite direction of trends in geographically proximate countries and the consistent discrepancy 
of asylum application rates among EU member states suggest that an asylum seeker’s choice of 
destination is influenced by the relative characteristics of possible receiving countries.  
 Compounding the issue of an unequal distribution of asylum applications is the persistent 
lack of asylum policy harmonization seen in the substantial variation of refugee recognition rates 
across the EU.  Examining cross-country differences in recognition rates for 1999, Neumayer 
(2005) found the success rates of Iraqi applications to be only about 10% in the Netherlands, 
28% in Austria, 43% in Germany, and 83% in Denmark.  As the integrity of the “country of first 
entry” policy implemented under the Dublin Regulation is contingent upon the equal treatment 
of asylum seekers, this lack of convergence in recognition rates undermines the goal of 
facilitating a Common European Asylum System (CEAS).  Previous studies have reached 
conflicting conclusions about this variation, with interpretations ranging from it being the result 
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of free riding in the provision of a public good (Suhrke, 1998), to the more recent approach of 
modelling it as a competitive regulatory game in which each country competes to minimize its 
own refugee inflow (Barbou des Places and Deffains, 2004); however, a greater understanding of 
recognition rate differences is not the primary purpose of this paper outside of the role this 
variation plays in determining asylum seeker inflows.  By viewing asylum seeker reception 
standards and recognition rates as possible factors influencing the disparate distribution of 
asylum application rates in the EU, a greater understanding of the largely unequal burden of 
refugee protection faced by member states will hopefully be reached. 
  
Literature Review 
 While numerous studies have already examined asylum application determinants, most of 
the work done focuses on past trends ranging from the 1980’s to the early 2000’s.  By combining 
aspects of those previous studies and applying my framework to an updated dataset I hope to 
extend the literature through a comprehensive empirical analysis of modern asylum application 
trends in the EU.  When comparing the economic state of pre-2000 Europe with more recent 
conditions, it becomes obvious that there have been dramatic changes in many of the explanatory 
variables found to be significant in previous studies.  For example, following the European Debt 
Crisis, unemployment rates skyrocketed in many EU countries with 2012 rates reaching over 
24% in Spain and Greece, 10% in Poland, France, Italy, and Hungary; while conversely 
remaining around 5% in countries such as Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands (Eurostat).  
Additionally, developing regional turbulence has driven large shifts in asylum trends, with the 
top five source countries of asylum seekers from 1982-2006 being Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, 
Lebanon, and Serbia (Hatton, 2009); compared with the top five in 2015 being Syria, 
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and Albania (BBC).  Although Iraq and Afghanistan remain 
consistent sources of asylum seekers, the war in Syria has dramatically increased overall 
applications to EU member states and consequently reshaped asylum patterns and even policy.  
Due to this almost unprecedented level of asylum applications, a more recent analysis of pull 
factor influences would be highly beneficial to EU policymakers attempting to find a common 
response the rapidly escalating crisis. 
 
Models and Dependent Variables of Previous Studies 
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 Building off well-established models in the literature, I plan to use cross-country panel 
data in regressing the monthly asylum application of EU-28 countries on a number of 
theoretically important destination country characteristics.  As done in Neumayer (2004), Hatton 
(2009), and Mayda (2005), I will run a panel data regression, only using a fixed effects model 
instead of the bilateral flows model done by Neumayer and Mayda.  Benefiting greatly from the 
recently established standards of data submission for EU member states reporting to Eurostat, I 
will examine monthly asylum applications from 2008-2014.  As migration data was submitted 
under far looser guidelines in the form of a “gentleman’s agreement” prior to 2008, it often 
resulted in incomplete and inconsistent data (DeWaard, 2012).  By using Eurostat data from 
2008-2014, I will have access to a more reliable dataset than those studies conducted prior to its 
establishment.  Due to it being a robust collection of data covering a wide variety of statistics, I 
should be able to use Eurostat as the source of most of my explanatory variables. 
 Although my empirical analysis is aided by the existence of established methodologies 
and access to more accurate data, there are a variety of complications that could potentially force 
me to alter my planned framework.  Using a monthly rate would require the controlling of 
seasonal variation and it seems reasonable to expect a lag of at least a year in the decision of 
application destination.  Additionally, while previous studies have attempted to determine 
methods of dealing with difficult to measure variables such as network effects and migration 
policies, in some cases they may be imprecise or difficult to emulate.   
 In evaluating the response of migration flows to cross-country variations in pull factors, a 
common method of controlling for origin country effects is to take the total number of asylum 
seekers or emigrants from each origin country as a given, and then determine the relative annual 
application rates for each destination country (Neumayer, 2004; Mayda, 2005) or the log number 
of relative annual application rates (Hatton, 2009).  As in my proposed model, a simpler method 
of controlling for origin country effects is to utilize a fixed effects model in which dummy 
variables are included for each time period, and comparisons are made within those time periods. 
As done by Thielemann (2003) in his analysis of pull factor determinants, an additional 
option for making wide-ranging asylum application quantities more comparable is to divide each 
destination country’s yearly application rate by its population size and calculate a country’s 
proportion based on the total number of asylum seekers, then divided by the total population of 
all EU destination countries.  Another possibility is to follow the framework of Jimenez-
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Jimenez’s (2013) study of EU-15 migrant density in which her dependent variable was the 
percentage of foreign citizens over the total population of an individual country in each year, 
substituting asylum applications for foreign citizen stock in my regression.  However, in using 
this method there is the likelihood that I would pick up origin country effects, which would 
require additional modifications to my proposed model. 
 
 
Independent Variables of Previous Studies 
For the assessment of my explanatory variables I will incorporate the methods found to 
be successful in the existing literature, while in some cases making appropriate adjustments in 
order to better suit my available dataset.  In measuring labor market conditions such as GDP per 
capita and the unemployment rate, I will follow the straightforward method of simply retrieving 
the relevant panel data from Eurostat, with the possibility of taking the log of GDP per capita to 
reduce distributional spread.  While estimations of strength for those variables vary across the 
literature, per capita income tends to be one of the most significant economic pull factors 
(Neumayer, 2004; Thielemann, 2003).  Similarly, Mayda (2005) found that a 10% increase in 
GDP per worker implies a 19% increase in immigration rate.  However, it is important to note 
that she was investigating total migration flows instead of asylum trends, which would likely 
cause her findings of economic pull factors to be more influential than those found in a study 
purely investigating asylum application rates. 
A third potential pull factor characterized by the economic conditions of possible 
destination countries is the production structure of each individual country.  In examining trends 
of migrant density in the EU-15 from 2000-2010, Jimenez-Jimenez (2013) measured the strength 
of the agriculture, industrial, and construction sectors by determining the relative percentages of 
employment for each in every individual destination country.  She found that high rates of 
employment in both the agriculture and construction sectors attract migrants, while a greater 
reliance on the industrial sector was associated with lower migration inflows.  Although this 
study was also investigating pull factors on total migration flows, and thus may have yielded 
stronger results than what I will find, it was an inclusion I didn’t see anywhere in the literature 
analyzing asylum application rates and it would be interesting to see if I find evidence of a 
similar conclusion.    
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Commonly found to be the most significant pull factor of migration inflows, network 
effects based on a destination country’s existing immigrant stock are largely used in the 
determination of the influence of historical ties between pairs of countries.  While Neumayer 
(2004) also included a variable measuring the number of years between 1900 and 1960 that an 
origin country was a former colony of a destination country, most of the other literature has 
found colonial and historical ties to be well instrumented for by measurements of existing 
immigrant stock.  In the bilateral flows model, the methodologies for capturing network effects 
include Neumayer’s (2004) use of the average share of asylum seekers from each origin country 
who applied to a destination country over the course of the previous two to five years, or 
Hatton’s (2009) use of the total stock of immigrants from a given origin country in each 
individual destination country.  
Alternative to the bilateral flows model, Jimenez-Jimenez (2013) captured network 
effects by including the log total of the foreign-born population for each destination country, and 
found it to be the second most influential pull factor behind GDP per capita.  Lastly, Thielemann 
(2003) determined network effects by using a lagged variable measuring the stock of immigrants 
from the top five asylum origin countries for each destination country, also finding it to be one of 
his most significant explanatory variables.  Combined, the conclusions reached by previous 
studies suggest that asylum seekers place high importance on the presence of fellow countrymen 
when determining a destination country, which is to be reasonably expected when faced with 
forced migration under circumstances of fairly limited information. 
Despite being a theoretically sensible inclusion among pull factor determinants, the 
generosity of a country’s welfare benefits has typically been found to have low levels of 
significance in past analyses.  As there isn’t a reliable source of data for the assessing the level of 
welfare benefits designed explicitly for asylum seekers, some measure of a country’s overall 
welfare benefits is often used as a substitution.  In specifically examining welfare-induced 
migration stemming from EU enlargement, De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) used the OECD’s 
calculation of benefits by which they take the average wage of a manufacturing worker and 
compute the amount of benefits that wage level is entitled to in the case of unemployment.  
Although concluding that welfare distortions could potentially be large enough to distort the 
benefits of a more mobile labor force, they found that increasing welfare benefits by one 
standard deviation caused an increase in migration inflow equal to only 37% of what a congruent 
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increase in wages would cause.  Similarly, Neumayer (2004) found his measure of welfare 
benefits as general welfare expenditures relative to GDP to be insignificant.  Even with these 
results, it seems plausible that welfare benefits are still taken into consideration when making a 
decision about potential destinations, and I feel it is prudent to include some metric of benefits in 
my analysis as it has been well documented that immigrant households are more likely to receive 
some type of welfare benefit when compared with native households (Borjas and Hilton, 1996; 
Riphahn, 1998). 
Exploiting the previously discussed lack of convergence in asylum recognition rates 
across the EU, many studies have explored the relationship between an asylum applicant’s 
likelihood of approval in a specific country and that country’s asylum application rates.  
Measured in a variety of ways, the probability of asylum recognition and a country’s overall 
migration policies have typically been found to exert a significant influence on migration 
inflows.  In evaluating the effect of a country’s recognition rate, Neumayer (2004) uses a lagged 
variable of each destination’s total first-instance recognition rate for all asylum applicants.  He 
uses a lagged variable for the reasons of it being unlikely that an asylum seeker has information 
on current-year recognition rates as well as to avoid potential endogeneity problems.  Using this 
measurement he found that a lower recognition rate is in fact associated with a lower asylum 
application rate.  In comparison, Hatton (2009) found the coefficient on total recognition rate to 
be small and insignificant.  Due to the fact that the probability of approval is likely to be an 
influential factor in theory, he attributed this insignificance to endogeneity problems in his model 
and instead instrumented for recognition rate using indices of three different dimensions of 
policy consisting of measurements for ease of access, processing procedure, and asylum seeker 
welfare.  Focusing on the processing procedure indicator, he found that increases in the 
likelihood of a country designating asylum claims as manifestly unfounded rather than granting a 
form of subsidiary status resulted in an estimated 16% reduction in application rates for every 10 
percentage point decrease in recognition rate.  As Eurostat has data on total recognition rates, as 
well as measurements of Dublin Requests and the number of immigrants refused at the border, I 
plan on incorporating a variety of these variables in my model to reach a robust conclusion on 
the effect of probability of approval. 
Other studies have likewise implemented indices consisting of various measures of a 
country’s policies toward immigrants and asylum seekers, such as Jimenez-Jimenez’s (2013) 
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integration policy index and Thielemann’s (2003) asylum seeker deterrence index.  Measuring 
the extent to which a country’s law treats immigrants with the same rights as native citizens, the 
use of MIPEX by Jimenez-Jimenez (2013) resulted in the finding that EU-15 countries with an 
index value above the average tended to have higher concentrations of foreign populations.  As 
highlighted earlier, the fact that she was examining total immigration rather than the subset of 
asylum seekers that I am analyzing could lead to different results, although the direction of 
influence for this variable is likely to be the same.  Specifically focusing on the effect of 
deterrent policy measures on asylum seeker inflows, Thielemann (2003) created an index of 
three dummy variables for whether a country had an applicant dispersal scheme, a non-cash 
based system of benefits, and a prohibitive law preventing asylum seekers from working until 
their claim has been approved.  Based on this index, he found that deterrent policies are 
significant in the negative direction, although they are not as influential as historic and economic 
pull factors.   
 
Policy Implications 
Widely referred to throughout the literature as a “race to the bottom”, the trend of EU 
member states attempting to reduce their relative attractiveness to asylum seekers through the 
enactment of increasingly restrictive policy measures has led to varied conclusions throughout 
the literature.  As previously referred to, Barbou des Places and Deffains (2004) have modeled 
this widespread spiral of restrictions in asylum legislation as a competitive regulatory game in 
which countries were competing to provide as little protection as possible in an attempt to 
decrease the escalating costs associated with a rapid influx of asylum seekers.  However, others 
such as Kvist (2004) in his analysis of a potential “race to the bottom” in setting welfare benefits 
during a past EU enlargement have contended that similar decreases in benefit levels are the 
result of individual labor market conditions rather than a strategic interaction among member 
states.  Despite these contentious views, it is my opinion that a “race to the bottom” is indeed 
taking place, exemplified by the recent actions of numerous EU states such as the shuttling of 
asylum seekers to alternative EU destinations, the recent erection of razor-wire fences in 
Hungary and Slovenia, and the announcement that Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia 
were no longer allowing in migrants unless they were from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (WSJ, 
2015). 
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As an attempt to reduce the unequal burden of refugee protection in the EU and 
internalize the positive externality of poverty alleviation, Moraga and Rapoport (2014) propose a 
system of tradable immigration quotas (TIQs), in which a market is created where countries 
could essentially pay other countries to accept their allotted proportion of asylum seekers.  In 
order to improve efficiency, they recommended supplementing the TIQ system with a matching 
mechanism attempting to pair countries and immigrants based on specific preferences.  In a 
following paper, Moraga and Rapoport (2014) show that the creation of a TIQ market has the 
added advantage of embracing heterogeneous EU conditions by exploiting the comparative 
advantages of destination countries and allocating labor to where it is needed.  While this is 
theoretically a very convincing system, much more research needs to be done in order to 
determine the initial allocation of quotas as well to better estimate the refugees’ relative rates of 
destination country preferences.  A greater knowledge of pull factors would highly benefit this 
model and the proposed plan to initiate the redistribution of 160,000 refugees (WSJ, 2015) , as it 
could allow the European Union to spread incoming refugees amongst countries with 
socioeconomic characteristics most closely associated to those that are highly desirable to 
refugees. 
It is of dire importance that the European Union finds a common and diligent response to 
the ever-mounting pressure of such an extreme inflow of asylum seekers, lest it falter and let the 
foundational solidarity upon which it was constructed be succumbed by conflicting notions of 
responsibility.  In this regard, it would be highly beneficial for policymakers in the EU, as well 
as all countries facing an influx of immigrants, to have a better understanding of the 
socioeconomic characteristics that attract asylum seekers to particular destinations over others.  I 
hope to extend the existing literature evaluating asylum application distributions by 
incorporating the methods found to be successful in previous studies into a comprehensive, 
updated analysis using recently standardized data.  While there will doubtlessly be difficulties in 
the actual construction of my proposed regression model, the extensive literature examining the 
subject of asylum application rate distributions will provide me with the necessary answers and 
alternative methods to overcome those obstacles and build a theoretically sound and well-
functioning model of the pull factor determinants of individual EU member state asylum 
application rates. 
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Data and Models 
In evaluating the relative influences of destination country pull factors on monthly 
asylum applications, my primary model will be a panel data fixed effects model in which I 
include dummy variables for monthly fixed effects.  This will allow my model to avoid biases 
stemming from source country push factors in each time period that affect asylum applications 
across all destination countries.  While this method may be a less elegant way of controlling for 
source country push factors when compared to the bilateral flows model, it should still provide 
an accurate representation of the relative significance of included pull factors.  Similarly, the fact 
that I could only find annual data for some of my explanatory variables may lead me to lose 
some accuracy in the estimations of my regression coefficients, although collapsing my data into 
an annual format provides a nice check of robustness.  All of my data over the time period of 
2008-2014 was taken from the Eurostat database, with the exception of data for total airline 
passengers, which was found in the World Bank database.  Each of my explanatory variables is 
lagged one year to account for the time delay in the spread of information. 
 
 
Estimating Model 
 
Yit= β0 + βj Xji(t-12)+ εit, where εit=  wt + vit                 (Equation 1) 
 
Where 
 Yit= Monthly asylum applications to countryi in montht 
 Xji(t-12)= A vector containing the ten explanatory variables, lagged by one year 
 Wt= Unobserved time fixed effects 
 Vit= Stochastic error term 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
      
% Change in Construction Production 2,016 -4.680% 11.694% -48.300% 27.300% 
% Change in Manufacturing Production 2,016 -0.877% 8.494% -25.400% 22.500% 
Agricultural Production 2,016 102.270 6.471 83.900 126.400 
Monthly Applications 2,280 1,074.886 2,029.290 0.000 22,500.000 
Unemployment Rate 2,352 9.718% 4.660% 3.100% 27.900% 
Income Per Capita 2,352 25,408.163 10,663.743 11,000.000 73,000.000 
Refused at Border 2,292 14,679.450 57,083.883 0.000 510,010.000 
Immigrant Pop. 1,968 1.8 million 2.7 million 30,474 10.2 million 
Welfare Expenditure (% GDP) 1,992 24.549% 6.109% 13.000% 38.200% 
Exterior Countries (10) 840 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Interior Countries (18) 1,512 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total Air Passengers 2,328 21 million 31 million 29,031 125 million 
Residence Permits 2,352 26,001.490 52,634.837 0.000 349,091.000 
      
Number of Countries 28 28 28 28 28 
 
  
Highlighted in Table 1, the European Union is anything but homogenous in regards to the 
characteristics included in my model.  Comparing the minimum and maximum for monthly 
applications as well as for my various explanatory variables emphasizes the disparate conditions 
of each country.  Likewise, while some variables may not change greatly over time within each 
country, exploiting the large cross-country differences seen will allow me to test the influence of 
each pull factor. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
 As my dependent variable I will be using the log of monthly asylum applications for each 
EU-28 destination country over the years 2008-2014.  Rather than normalizing monthly 
applications by population, I included a variable for the annual population of each destination 
country.  As the monthly applications do not follow a normal distribution, I am taking a log to 
smooth the distribution.  To avoid time and seasonal biases that affect total asylum applications 
to all countries, I will incorporate a monthly fixed effects estimator.  While there has been a 
strong increase in monthly applications for almost all countries observed in my model, the 
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persistent lack of convergence allows me to analyze what socioeconomic factors are driving this 
disparity.  
 
Figure 1                                                                                         Figure 2 
 
 Figure 1 provides an example of the disparity in monthly asylum applications for six EU 
countries.  Figure 2 highlights the difference in asylum applications between interior region EU 
countries and those on the exterior, as discussed in the explanation of my region variable below.  
These graphs show that some destination countries do seem to be more attractive to asylum 
seekers, with Figure 2 providing evidence that large numbers of asylum seekers seem to ignore 
the standards set by the Dublin Regulation and are driven to journey further inwards in order to 
apply for asylum at a more attractive destination. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
 Starting with my independent variable capturing income opportunities, I will be using 
countryi(t-12)’s log(GDP per capita), measured in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS).  This allows 
for cross-country comparisons by accounting for differences in the purchasing power of the 
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different currencies used in my destination countries.  As per capita income has been found to be 
a significant pull factor in the previous literature (Neumayer, 2004; Thielemann, 2003), I expect 
this variable to be statistically significant and to assert a positive influence on application rates.  
 In evaluating labor market conditions, I will be using the monthly unemployment rate of 
countryi(t-12).  As there has been large but unequal changes in EU unemployment rates across this 
time period, this variable should give an accurate approximation of how asylum seekers respond 
to changes in the labor market.  While I am unsure how aware asylum seekers are of labor 
market conditions, it is theoretically sound to assume the ease with which an asylum seeker 
believes he will find a job should influence his decision, leading countryi’s unemployment rate to 
put downward pressure on monthly application rates.  Figure 3 shows that EU countries have 
wide-ranging unemployment rates, and this difference likely plays a role in the destination 
decision.  
(Figure 3) 
 
Figure 3- Monthly unemployment rate graph highlighting persistent disparity in labor market 
conditions 
 
As a third measurement of destination country economic conditions, I am including a 
variable for potential welfare benefits, measured as a percentage of GDP.  Although countryi(t-
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12)’s welfare expenditure hasn’t been found to be statistically significant in previous studies 
(Neumayer, 2004: De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009), I think it is wise to include a metric of social 
protection expenditure from the updated Eurostat database.  Asylum seekers are likely to need 
some sort of government aid as they settle in their new country, and thus this variable should 
exert a positive influence on monthly asylum application rates. 
 As a final estimator of economic pull factors I am using variables measuring the strength 
of various production sectors found to be statistically significant in previous migration studies 
(Jimenez-Jimenez, 2013).  While she found that high rates of employment in both the agriculture 
and construction sectors attract migrants, a greater reliance on the industrial sector was 
associated with lower migration inflows.  Although this was an analysis of total migration and 
not solely asylum application, I expect the relative strengths of those sectors to exert a similar 
influence.  
 In order to account for the effect of differences in the reception of asylum seekers on 
application rates, I am including an annual variable measuring the logged number of migrants 
refused at the border for countryi(t-12).  Although I initially planned on including a variable 
measuring each country’s asylum application rejection rate, I ran into endogeneity problems 
between this rate and my dependent variable.  By using a measurement of the number of 
migrants refused at the border I hope to still capture the effect of differences in migrant reception 
standards among my destination countries.  The probability that an asylum applicant will be 
allowed in and recognized should theoretically influence the decision of destination country, and 
thus higher numbers of refusals should put downward pressure on monthly application rates. 
 In order to capture the effect existing immigrant populations have on asylum application 
rates, I am including an annual variable measuring the logged number of non-EU immigrants for 
each destination country.  Commonly found to be the most significant pull factor on migration 
inflows (Neumayer, 2004; Hatton, 2009; Thielemann, 2003), I expect network effects to exert a 
highly positive influence on monthly asylum applications.  This is theoretically sound, as having 
a linkage of migrants from a source country facilitates a greater spreading of information, a 
network of support, and a greater likelihood of familial connections. 
 While most of the focus on the plight of asylum seekers tends to be on those making the 
dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea or through Turkey, there is likely a group of 
seekers who were either able to afford a flight to their destination country or who were already 
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temporarily residing in an EU country, and applied for asylum in order to avoid the danger of 
returning to their source country.  To test for the potential draw of a country being an easily 
accessible air hub, I included an annual variable measuring the total number of aircraft 
passengers for air carriers registered in each country.  To test for the effect of temporary 
residents in turn applying for asylum, I included a variable measuring the total number of three-
to-eleven month temporary resident passes granted for work or education in each country.  As 
my explanatory variables are lagged by one year, all of these passes would be expired by the 
time they are incorporated into my asylum application model, leading the permit holders to 
pursue means of continuing to reside in EU destination countries.       
 Finally, in order to account for the geographical proximity of certain countries to the 
common migration routes through the Mediterranean Sea and Turkey, I included a dummy 
variable coded 1 for those EU countries in the exterior region and coded 0 for primarily 
landlocked countries in which asylum seekers would have to travel through other EU countries in 
order to apply for asylum.  According to the Dublin Regulation, asylum seekers are supposed to 
apply for asylum in the country they first step foot in, yet many asylum seekers pass through 
those exterior countries in order to seek refuge in Northern European countries.  This dummy 
variable was also intended to serve a secondary purpose, as most of the Eastern European 
countries asylum seekers would first pass through tend to be less wealthy when compared to 
their Northwestern counterparts.  It was hoped that the inclusion of this dummy variable would 
then aid in a more accurate approximation of the influence of income opportunities on asylum 
applications. 
 
 
Interior Region Countries:  
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
 
Exterior Region Countries:  
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, Spain       
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Results 
 As seen in Table 2, I ran my monthly application regression under three different 
specifications to test for the consistency of my estimates.  Table 3 shows these same models, 
except my data is collapsed to annual figures in order to test the robustness of my results without 
as much variation from factors such as seasonality.  Column 1 shows my results for the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) method of regression in which no fixed effects are controlled for.  Column 
2 shows the estimation results of my primary model as specified by Equation 1, in which 
monthly fixed effects are controlled for.  Finally, Column 3 shows my results for a model 
controlling for both monthly fixed effects and time invariant country fixed effects.  My 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year in all model specifications.        
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Table 2: Monthly Regression Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS Time Fixed Effects Time and Country Fixed 
Effects 
    
Log(Income Per Capita) -0.822*** -0.810 3.349** 
 (0.169) (0.556) (1.445) 
Welfare Expenditure (% GDP) 0.132*** 0.135*** -0.021 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.100) 
Unemployment Rate -0.114*** -0.112*** 0.051 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.030) 
% Change in Construction Production 0.016*** 0.016 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) 
% Change in Manufacturing Production 0.008** 0.016 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.030) (0.007) 
Agricultural Production 0.004 0.007 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.016) (0.009) 
Log(Refused at Border) -0.013 -0.013 0.141 
 (0.026) (0.050) (0.104) 
Log(Immigrant Pop.) 0.588*** 0.575*** -0.156 
 (0.045) (0.113) (1.346) 
Log(Residence Permits) 0.079*** 0.085 0.017 
 (0.018) (0.067) (0.032) 
Log(Total Air Passengers) 0.097*** 0.099 0.073 
 (0.029) (0.078) (0.183) 
Months 0.014***   
 (0.002)   
Region = 1 0.483*** 0.530***  
 (0.076) (0.122)  
Region = 1, omitted   - 
    
Constant -7.740*** 0.704 -27.968 
 (1.840) (5.472) (19.340) 
    
Observations 1,560 1,560 1,560 
R-squared 0.697 0.698 0.109 
Number of Months  72  
Number of Countries   28 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
My Column 1 results show that before accounting for monthly fixed effects, ten 
explanatory variables were found to be statistically significant, nine of which were found to be 
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highly significant.  While a majority of the coefficients for those variables found to be significant 
exert influences as hypothesized, the variables for annual percent change in manufacturing 
output and log of income per capita were found to go in the opposite direction.  The income 
variable is of particular surprise as it exerts a strongly negative influence even after accounting 
for the poorer, exterior EU countries.   
 As seen in my Column 2 results, the majority of my explanatory variables lose 
significance under my primary time fixed effects model.  However, even after controlling for 
monthly fixed effects, the variables of welfare expenditure as a percent of GDP, unemployment 
rate, and log of existing immigrant population are all found to be highly significant and exert 
influences as hypothesized.  In agreement with the findings of Hatton (2009), Neumayer (2004), 
and Thielemann (2003), a destination country’s existing immigrant population is the strongest 
pull factor on the asylum application choice, with a 1% increase in immigrant population 
associated with a .575% increase in monthly asylum applications, ceteris paribus.  While found 
to be more significant than in previous studies, the welfare expenditure and unemployment rate 
of a potential destination country are theoretically plausible strong influencers on asylum 
applications, as asylum seekers will likely need some sort of government aid upon arrival and 
would also likely prefer a destination in which it is relatively easier to find work. 
 Lastly, Column 3 shows the results for my model in which both monthly fixed effects and 
country fixed effects are controlled for.  As seen in the R2 statistic, this model explains very little 
of the variation in monthly asylum applications, and the variables previously found to be 
statistically significant lose their significance.  One possible explanation is that while the time 
fixed effects model is comparing the influence of explanatory variables from a cross-section of 
diverse countries in each time period, this model is attempting to make that comparison after 
controlling for destination country characteristics already incorporated into the model.  Also of 
note is the log of income per capita variable, as it regains the significance lost in the time fixed 
effects model and its coefficient changes signs.  Suggesting that a 1% increase in destination 
country income per capita is associated with a 3.35% increase in monthly asylum applications, 
all else equal, this finding is more in line with the results of previous studies such as Mayda 
(2005), Neumayer (2004), and Thielemann (2003).  However, the fact that this variable changes 
signs so extremely makes me question the validity of results from this particular specification.  
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 Seen below in Table 3, running my regressions with annual data yielded results similar to 
those found in Table 2.  However, the annual data produces more closely matched results 
between the OLS and time fixed effects models, leading me to believe that the variables found to 
be significant only in the monthly OLS regression are not very good indicators of true 
significance.  As welfare expenditure, unemployment rate, and existing immigrant population are 
robust to changes in specification and keep their significance for both monthly and annual data in 
OLS as well as time fixed effects models, I believe my results accurately indicate their strength 
as pull factors.  Once again, the time and country fixed effects model yields contrasting results to 
my previous estimates.  Perhaps incorporating country fixed effects into my model provides a 
more accurate way of controlling for those included explanatory variables that change very little 
for each country over time as well as any unobserved variables, and thus provides a more 
accurate estimation of income opportunity effects. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
23 
 
Table 3: Annual Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS Time Fixed Effects Time and Country Fixed 
Effects 
    
Log(Income Per Capita) -0.697 -0.674 3.273** 
 (0.499) (0.447) (1.519) 
Welfare Expenditure (% GDP) 0.120*** 0.122*** -0.049 
 (0.029) (0.014) (0.101) 
Unemployment Rate -0.115*** -0.114*** 0.048 
 (0.030) (0.015) (0.033) 
% Change in Construction Production 0.018* 0.018 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) 
% Change in Manufacturing Production 0.011 0.017 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.009) 
Agricultural Production 0.003 0.004 -0.007 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.008) 
Log(Refused at Border) -0.045 -0.046 0.049 
 (0.084) (0.053) (0.092) 
Log(Immigrant Population) 0.570*** 0.564*** -0.605 
 (0.149) (0.099) (1.159) 
Log(Residence Permits) 0.075 0.078 0.021 
 (0.060) (0.067) (0.028) 
Log(Total Air Passengers) 0.115 0.116 0.089 
 (0.096) (0.071) (0.173) 
Year 0.144*   
 (0.075)   
Region = 1 0.588** 0.622***  
 (0.257) (0.104)  
Region = 1, omitted   - 
    
Constant -286.402* 2.694 -17.236 
 (151.195) (4.536) (16.166) 
    
Observations 134 134 134 
R-squared 0.712 0.710 0.199 
Number of Years  6  
Number of Countries   28 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Conclusion 
 As indicated by my results and supported by previous findings, asylum seekers are indeed 
aware of differences in destination country characteristics and these differences do play a role in 
the asylum application choice.  While the network effects resulting from a large existing 
immigrant population undoubtedly lead to increases in asylum applications through the benefits 
of increased connection, communication, and information, there is strong evidence that economic 
conditions such as the labor market and the welfare state also affect the destination decision.  
Once the decision to flee their home is made, asylum seekers take stock of and are influenced by 
the relative likelihoods of finding employment as well as receiving support in the form of 
government provided welfare benefits.  The fact that these explanatory variables are both 
statistically significant leads to potential insights into the motivations behind the asylum seeker 
decision, such as having the need for welfare support yet having the desire to find gainful 
employment.  In addition, all three of the variables I found to have significant influence are 
difficult for destination country governments to manipulate, suggesting the need to find 
alternative policy measures rather than attempts to make a country relatively less attractive. 
 One potential solution to the disparate distribution of asylum applications is the 
previously mentioned creation of an EU-wide market for tradable immigration quotas (TIQ’s) as 
proposed by Moraga and Rapoport (2014).  By internalizing the positive externality associated 
with alleviating the massive, uneven burden faced by various EU member states, the EU could 
reach a common solution while preserving foundational policies such as the Schengen 
Agreement.  Preserving a border-free travel zone would yield immense benefits to all EU 
members, yet without a unified solution this crisis threatens to greatly exacerbate rising divisive 
sentiment.  My results show that the destination decision is largely based on unchangeable 
factors, and unless the difficult crises in Syria and the Middle East radically improve, these 
asylum trends will only continue to grow.  Supported by previous findings such as Hatton            
( 2004), this means that instead of searching for individualistic ways of dealing with this influx, 
the EU needs to reach a rational solution that accurately reflects the existing conditions.  By 
imposing a system of TIQ’s, the EU could ease the mounting pressure faced by select member 
states while simultaneously allocating asylum seekers to those countries with a comparative 
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advantage in refugee reception and a need for increased labor.  This system would provide 
massive windfalls for both the EU and asylum seekers in desperate need of sanctuary. 
 An asylum seeker would not make the decision to embark on a difficult and very 
dangerous journey, permanently leaving their home and past life, unless it was absolutely 
necessary.  The fact that they choose to confront harsh conditions and enlist the aid of traffickers 
in order to trek into an unknowable future shows how desperate they are to escape the despair of 
their homeland.  It is understandable then, that after making this exhaustive journey an asylum 
seeker would want to settle in a country that provides the most utility and opportunity.  Based on 
the results of my analysis, the most important factors playing into this decision are the existence 
of network effects stemming from a large immigrant population, an easing of hardship in the 
form of government provided welfare benefits, and the likelihood of finding gainful 
employment.  If the EU wants find a common solution to this crisis and halt the crumbling of its 
foundational policies and institutions, it must come to terms with the large role these factors play 
in the disproportionate distribution of asylum applicants.  A solution to this crisis is of dire 
importance for the displaced masses, the European Union, and global stability.    
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